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Abstract 
Unlike many other international instruments, accession to the WTO does not simply require the 
commitment of the government to sign and ratify the multilateral agreements. A country needs to 
make considerable legislative and administrative changes to comply with the standards of the 
WTO and its members to finalize the negotiation for accession. For governments with impure 
free market economy policy the challenges amplify.  
The government of Ethiopia publicly pronounces its adherence to the ideology of the 
developmental state. On the other hand the nucleus of WTO principles is progressive trade 
liberalization. Therefore, this dissertation tries to provide some reflection on the paradox created 
as a result of the divergence in priority between WTO principles and developmental state in the 
context of Ethiopian desire to join the organization.  
 
The research is an interdisciplinary work. The issues that will be discussed are not purely legal in 
their nature. They have legal, political and economic dimensions. And the main focus of the 
paper is on trade in services and foreign investment negotiation aspect of the accession. 
Furthermore the objective of the dissertation is to give some insight for policy makers about the 
challenges and opportunities that „Developmental State‟ ideology will pose in the accession 
process of Ethiopia to the WTO. 
The research is divided into five chapters. Chapter one gives introductory remarks about the 
concept of the developmental state and accession to the WTO. The limitations of the WTO 
accession process and an overview of the features of developmental state in the world and 
particularly in Ethiopia are also briefly discussed in the chapter. The origin and concept of 
developmental state in the world, in Africa and Ethiopia is discussed in some detail under 
chapter two. The chapter also tries to show the impact of developmental state policies in the laws 
of the country that are going to be deliberated in the process of accession. Chapter three is about 
accession to the WTO. In this chapter the requirements, benefits, challenges and procedures of 
accession are dealt in depth. The writer debates and tries to show the fact that the system is 
slowly shifting from rule based negotiation to power and precedent based negotiation. By 
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analyzing the laws of Ethiopia that are inspired by the principles of developmental state against 
the legal and precedent requirements to join the WTO, I tried to correlate the findings of chapter 
two and three in chapter four. Specific strategies and advises on how to move the negotiation 
forward on certain areas are also outlined in this chapter. Finally, conclusion and my summarized 
recommendations are placed under chapter five.    
.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Ethiopia is one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in sub-Sahara Africa with a population 
of more than 90 million.
1
 Although Ethiopia is the 9
th
 largest country in Africa, its Gross 
Domestic Product was only 54.8 billion USD in 2014.
2
 The Economy has been growing steadily 
for the last 10 years. Agriculture accounts for 41.6% of the real GDP.
3
 However, as the economy 
modernizes; its share is slowly decreasing. In 2010 the government launched a five years growth 
and transformation plan (GTP).
4
 The industry is anticipated to play a key role in the economy if 
the GTP is successfully executed.
5
 The main motive for focusing on the industry sector is to 
increase the export trade of the country. 
International trade is the mechanism to carry out export trade, as a result engaging in bilateral or 
multilateral trade agreements boost a country‟s role in international trade. Among the 
multilateral trade agreements by far the most important and broad in scope are those agreements 
which are supervised by the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO is fundamentally an 
organization committed for trade liberalization.
6
 Black‟s Law dictionary defines trade 
liberalization as a reduction or removal in trade practices that thwart free flow of services and 
goods from one country to another
7
. The end goal of trade liberalization is to create a plain 
playing field for all traders so that the basis of competition will be comparative and competitive 
advantages. 
                                                          
1
 World Bank, countries data, found at (http://www.worldbank.org). 
2
 ibid. 
3
 Ministry of Finance and Economic development, Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia Growth and 
transformation Plan (volume 1, Addis Ababa 2010) 4.  
4
 ibid 1. 
5
 ibid.  
6
 Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organization (Oxford University Press 2005) 2.   
7
 Black’s law dictionary-free online dictionary, Found at (http:// www.thelawdictionary.org). 
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 Ethiopia, as a LDC, has the opportunity to access American and European markets without the 
requirement of reciprocity. Besides, it is a member of Regional Economic Integration agreements 
such as COMESA. But these arrangements have not significantly improved the volume of the 
export trade of the country. 
An increase in international trade participation would create profound effect on the economy of a 
country; on the other hand the share of Ethiopia in the world trade is indeed very little.
8
 And 
when it is compared with other African counties, it is also among the least. Though the economy 
of Ethiopia grew by double digits according to the government data for the last 8-10 years, it has 
been losing its steam in recent years.
9
 In the 2012/2013 budget year the economy grew at its 
weakest pace in a decade.
10
 Therefore, I believe joining the WTO in the near future has never 
been more urgent for the country. 
 The rationale behind Sovereign states come up together to create an international organization or 
treaty is to solve problems which are common to all or most nations, which is why their principle 
of operation is all sovereign states have a presumptive right of membership.
11
 “By contrast, the 
WTO operates more like a club to which countries can claim no presumption membership and 
must instead meet whatever standards and demand might be set by the existing members.”12 As a 
result the accession process to the WTO repeatedly labeled as cumbersome and time consuming. 
For LDCs like Ethiopia, extended period of negotiation will also stretch the limited technical and 
financial resources of the country.  
Scholars and trade negotiators alike argue that due to the lack of predetermined set of clean cut 
rules for accession, the price of joining the WTO is increasing from time to time.
13
 That means 
acceding countries are required to liberalize their trade regime more than the members did. These 
additionally required commitments by the new members are known as „WTO- plus‟ obligations 
                                                          
8
 According to WTO country basic indicators Ethiopia’s share in the world total exports and imports are 0.02 and 
0.05 respectively (http://www.wto.org). 
9
 Ministry of Finance and Economic development, Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia Growth and 
transformation Plan, volume 1, (Addis Ababa, 2010) 4.  
10
 Ethio channel weekly newspaper, September 10, 2013, page 1. 
11
 Craig Van Grasstek, Why demands on acceding countries increase over time (UN publication 2001) 116. 
12
 ibid. 
13
Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen kwa, Behind the scene at the WTO The real world of International Trade 
Negotiation (Zed Books Ltd 2004); Roman Glynberg,Manleed Dugal and Mohammad A Razzaque, An evaluation of 
the terms of accession(Common Wealth Secretariat 2006); Roman Gynberg and Roy Mickey Joy, The accession of 
Vanuatu to the WTO (UN publication 2001) 54. 
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and „WTO- minus‟ rights.14 „WTO-plus‟ obligations were first witnessed in the accession of the 
former Soviet Union countries. But it was not as such divisive until the Chinese accession 
commitments were released to the public.
15
  
In my opinion it is a deliberate move by the heavy weight members of the WTO that resulted in 
the present shape of the article XII of the WTO agreement.
16
 The ambiguity and uncertainty 
created as a result of this provision is utilized by members to force acceding counties to accept 
„WTO- plus‟ obligations and „WTO- minus‟ rights. I believe this is because the WTO agreement 
was prepared with neo-liberal economy and political assumptions. Hence, it has an inherent 
deficiency to incorporate other types of political or economic ideologies to the system; to coerce 
those countries with different economic philosophy to comply with the neo- liberal principles in 
the process of negotiation; the article was designed and put in its brevity and ambiguity.
17
Instead 
of just stating that reaching an agreement with the WTO is required, in my view the provision 
should have been formulated in a manner which lays the basic requirements for accession. 
Accession to the WTO will have certainly a positive impact on the entire economic activity of a 
country. The WTO is not only about eliminating trade barriers, but it is also about the opening up 
of a country to the world and showing the economic policy stability of a government to potential 
foreign and local investors.
18
 The Chinese, Vietnamese and Cambodians experience tells us that 
joining WTO, especially for those countries with comparative advantage in the means of 
production, dramatically increases the export trade.
19
 Over 90 million people give Ethiopia an 
                                                          
14
 Julia ya Qin, ‘“WTO-plus” obligations and their implications for the WTO legal system’, (Journal of world trade, 
volume 37) 483. 
15
ibid.  
16
    Article XII of the WTO agreement  
  Accession 
    1.       Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial     
relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may 
accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 
 
    2.       Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall 
approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO. 
 
     3.       Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement. 
17
 ibid 504-505. 
18
 Constantine Michalopoulos, WTO accession. (World Bank 2002) 61 
19
 Africa and the WTO Doha and beyond, (Economic Commission for Africa 2001) 
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advantage of cheap labor.  Moreover, recent investments by the government in the education 
sector, particularly in technical training, has made the working force to be relatively skillful in 
low level manufacturing activities. 
The fact that Ethiopia was not colonized by Western Powers provided the country with the 
opportunity to actively participate in international diplomacy and politics. As a consequence it 
was among the early member of the League of Nation, and it was the founding member of 
United Nations, Organization for African Unity, World Bank and IMF
20
. However, this 
international diplomatic activity was not translated in to a meaningful participation in 
international trade and economic activities.  
Ethiopia is not a founding member of any major economic cooperation agreement including 
WTO. It only applied for WTO membership in January 2003. Tough ten years has elapsed y after 
membership application, except for submission of memorandum and answering questions, no 
significant activity was taken place. It was only in February 2012 that the initial goods offer was 
submitted. But the negotiation is not yet really kicked off. The working party has demanded for 
an initial services offer before serious negotiation starts.
21
 Currently the country‟s WTO 
accession team is engaged in the preparation of the initial services offer. 
Melesse Zenawi, the late prime minister of Ethiopia, was known for his criticism of neo-liberal 
thinking. He passionately argued that neo-liberal policies are proved unsuccessful in Africa.
22
 He 
was the architecture of the developmental state policies of the Ethiopian People‟s Revolutionary 
Front /EPRDF/, which has been in power for more than 20 years. As the government of Ethiopia 
sees the country as a developmental state, its policies are the manifestations of the belief that the 
government has irreplaceable role in the economic development of a country.
23
 
The concept and application of developmental state varies from time to time, region to region 
and even from country to country. Historically its origin can be traced to the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century 
                                                          
20
 Ethiopia joined League of Nations On September 28, 1923, United Nations on September 13, 1945, Organization 
for African Unity on May 25, 1963 and World Bank & IMF on December 27, 1945. 
21
 An interview with a member of the technical committee of accession to WTO at the Ministry of Trade.   
22
Wolde Gebriel, ‘EPRDF, Developmental State and Rent seeking’, found at (http:// 
www.relooney.info/NS4030/00-Ethiopia-Economy_2.pdf) (p 3). 
23
 Asnake Kefale, ‘Narratives of Developmentalism and Development in Ethiopia’, found at 
http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/41-60/panels-57/Asnake-kefale-full-paper.pdf (2011) 7. 
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Western Europe.
24
 But I believe its best application so far was in the late 20
th
 century in South 
East Asia countries. Based on the policies of their governments, currently there are several 
countries around the world which can be considered as developmental states in the broader sense 
of the concept. These countries range from China which is ruled by communist party to the 
democratically elected government of Brazil. 
As the concept of developmental state differs from country to country, the same to for the 
definition of the term; for my purpose I use the definition from Bagchi, whose expression 
perfectly echoes the situation in Ethiopia. “Developmental state is a state that puts economic 
development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective 
instruments to promote such a goal.‟‟25  The Ethiopian government argues that to accelerate 
economic growth, the government should play an active role in the economy either as a regulator 
or as an actor.
26
 Accordingly from setting prices to certain goods like sugar to providing some 
services in monopoly such as telecommunication, the government has an extensive role in the 
market. It also bans foreigners from participating in some strategic economic activities like 
banking and insurance. 
Apparently the policies of developmental state are not compatible with the trade liberalization 
goal of WTO. China as a socialist developmental state has opened up its market before and after 
its accession.
27
 Despite the fact that the communist party conceded plenty of its previous policies 
during the negotiation, it did not lose the developmental nature when it joined the organization in 
2001 after the conclusion of the accession process. Therefore, an in-depth study of the 
experience of China can be used as an important road map for the accession process of Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia has set a goal to join the WTO by 2015. However, this ambitious goal looks 
increasingly unattainable. The government as stands does not seem prepared to compromise its 
developmental policies in exchange for membership to WTO.
28
 But I strongly believe that the 
                                                          
24
Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The developmental state in history and in twentieth century (Regency Publications 2004) 9. 
25
Amiya Kumar Bagchi, ‘The past and the future of the Developmental State’ (Journal of World System Research, 
VI, 2, 2000) 398. 
26
 Kefale (n 20)6-7. 
27
 Pang Rong Quian, Selected economic and political issues of China’s GATT\WTO membership (The Center for 
Trade Policy and Law 1996) 49. 
28
 If we look at second round of questions and answers (e.g. Q13 and 14) the government is not willing to liberalize 
the financial and telecom sector in near future. 
13 
 
Chinese economic miracle in the 1
st
 decade of the new millennium is a living example of the fact 
that those concessions are worth making. 
As I said above the economic growth in Ethiopia is slowing, so the government should search for 
a new frontier to accelerate it. Joining WTO will deliver a strong economic growth by expanding 
the country‟s international trade and foreign direct investment. Some insiders say that after the 
death of the late prime minister, the accession process has been stalled for the past couple of 
years. In my opinion it seems the new administration does not appreciate the benefits of quick 
accession. This is unfortunate, the longest the entry to the WTO, the longest the country will 
remain in the margins of international trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Definition and application of the concept of developmental state 
 
The developmental state is a multidimensional concept. It can be studied from a political, 
sociological or legal point of view. From the perspective of political scientists it is one type of 
political ideology to run a government.
29
 But this does not mean that the political concept is not 
interrelated to the legal concept. The political ideology of a ruling party is the basis for the 
policies of a country at that point of time. And usually legal norms are driven by the policies of 
the government, thus it can be said that political ideologies have a direct influence on 
lawmaking. 
The legal concept of developmental state is not yet well-developed. In the neo-liberal model, the 
purpose of the law of the land is primarily to protect private property, to facilitate contracts and 
to limit the power of the state.
30
 However, it is not easy to illustrate the fundamentals of the legal 
concept of developmental state.
31
 This is not only because the concept varies from country to 
country, but it is also because the political dimension usually overshadows the legal concept. I 
think the legal regime of developmental state should focus on striking the balance between the 
roles of the state in the economic development of a nation and protecting the well-established 
right to property of individuals and non-state entities.  
From the sociological point of view the more appropriate name for the developmental state is 
„Welfare State.‟ Welfare state is known for its policy of living behind nobody. There is a 
consensus among citizens to look for the disadvantaged and the poor.
32
 Therefore the tax burden 
is heavier on the rich so as to bring about universal coverage of health, education, shelter, etc. to 
                                                          
29
 Neo- liberalism and Socialism can be mentioned as other types of ideology. 
30
David M Trubek, ‘Developmental States and The Legal Order towards a New Political Economy Development and 
law’ (University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research paper No 1075 2008) page 5. 
31
 ibid 
32
 Stein Kulhnle and Sven E.O.Hort, The Developmental Welfare State in Scandinavia Lessons for developing world, 
(UN Research Institute for Social Development program paper No 17, 2004) 8. 
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all of its inhabitants. In the Scandinavian countries the sociological dimension of developmental 
state is more dominant. Public responsibility for welfare provision and the principle of universal 
coverage based on social right are the characteristics of this part of the world.
33
 
My objective of studying developmental state is to determine its impact on the accession of a 
country to the WTO. Thus both the political and legal dimension of the concept, though the 
demarcation is fluid, will be examined in this chapter. 
The main contention point that generates the ideological war on the type of the government is the 
role of the state. Some argue that the state is the most important socio-economic and political 
institution in the society.
34
 Others contend that the state should have a minimal role in the life of 
its citizens. The proponents of the former thought fell in the basket of developmentalists. And the 
advocates of the later are neo-liberalists. Unlike the Marxists both agree on the importance of 
free market economy. The liberalists argue that the market is more perfect and effective when it 
is less regulated. In addition they say the rent seeking attitude of public officials will make the 
participation of the state in the economy wasteful and inefficient.
35
  
On the other side of the spectrum, the developmentalists argue that profit is the sole incentive for   
private investors; as a result they say private actors may not be attracted to participate in areas 
that are not profitable in short period but are vital for the overall development of the society.
36
 
And they further argue that in addition to the fact that neo-liberal policies were proved 
unsuccessful in most developing countries, the 2008 financial and economic crises speaks loud 
as to the consequences of excessive deregulation in the economy.
37
 
The core principle of developmental state is putting economic agenda a priority and 
implementing effective mechanism to achieve this goal.
38
 It is usually evident that at one point of 
a country history, the government has an active role in the economy. The pre-industrialized 
Netherlands, England and Germany were the places where today‟s concept of developmental 
                                                          
33
 Ibid. 
34
 ‘The Developmental State: what options for Africa’ (UN Economic Commission for Africa Issue Paper 2012). 
35
Turebk (n 27) 4. 
36
 Edigheji Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa (p 291). 
37
 ibid 
38
Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The Developmental State under Imperialism 228. 
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state was first originated. 
39
 But the model was forgotten for centuries until its reemergence in 
South East Asian countries. When South Korea and Japan joined the ranks of developed states in 
a short period of time, it took the attention both politicians and economists to study their 
interventionist economic policy.
40
 Consequently, the theory of developmental state started to be 
discussed in every corner of the globe. This phenomenon is known as the reemergence of the 
„New Developmental State.‟41 
This new way of developmental thinking attracted many newly independent states of Africa and 
South America
42
. Consequently in the 1960
th
 and 1970
th
 African countries adopted state lead 
development strategy. Nevertheless, the government involvement in the economy as producer, 
trader and banker resulted in unsustainable macroeconomic instability.
43
 Subsequently African 
governments‟ first application of developmental state policies failed and lead to the 1990th 
structural adjustment programs by IMF.
44
 
After African states adopted the painful structural adjustment programs, their economies did not 
grow as expected.
45
 Lack of good governance and poor quality of state institutions were 
considered the root causes for the stagnation to their economies.
46
 As a result international 
institutions like IMF and World Bank started to accept the fact that the state has a role in 
economic development.
47
 Hence, policy makers and scholars across Africa once again 
proclaimed the state should play a more active role in the economy. Moreover, the argument 
about the role of the state in economic development has come full circle after the financial and 
economic crises of 2008.
48
 However, currently only two African states openly declare they are 
developmental states; these are South Africa and Ethiopia.
49
 
                                                          
39
 Bagchi (n 21) 9-29. 
40
Thandika Makandawire, ‘Thinking about developmental state in Africa’ (Cambridge Journal of Economics 2001, 
25,289-313) 291. 
41
 Trubek ( n 27) 1 
42
‘The Developmental State: what options for Africa’ (UN Economic Commission for Africa Issue Paper 2012). 3 
43
Kefale (n 20) 4-5.  
44
 ibid 
45
 ibid. 
46
Makandawire (n 37) 29. 
47
 ‘The Developmental State: what options for Africa’ (UN Economic Commission for Africa Issue Paper 2012). 1 
48
 ibid 2 
49
Kefale (n 20) 5.  
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Ethiopia was ruled by a military dictatorship until 1991. The then socialist rebels deposed the 
military rule and announced a Federal Democratic system of government. By the time the rebels 
(now the ruling party) took control of the country, due to the collapse of Soviet Union followed 
by the collapse of socialism in most parts of the world, the balance of power in the world was 
already shifting. Therefore, the new power holders were forced to change their ideology and 
declared a free market economy. During the first 10 years of EPRDF rule, Ethiopian Economy 
was stagnant. On top of this the country was engaged in a full-fledged war with its neighbor 
Eritrea. After the war ended in 2001, the ruling party split into two; the winner faction led by the 
late Prime Minister Melesse Zenawi right away shifted its focus to the economy and started to 
draft the economic and political policies of the country. Until 2006 the government was mostly 
known for its agricultural led economic development policy. But after the controversial 2005 
election the government introduced its developmental state policy. Some question the reason for 
adopting such policy by EPRDF. 
         “For the political opposition the main reason behind the promotion of 
developmentalism appears to be the need to provide a new legitimacy for 
a regime that failed to translate its promises of democracy particularly 
after the deeply controversial 2005 election.”50 
 Whatsoever the reason behind the fact that Ethiopia is now a developmental state either in the 
loose or strict sense of the concept is unquestionable. It is said that the main feature of the 
developmental state is its frequent interventionist policy of the government in to the economy; 
Ethiopian government interventionist policy can be extracted from different legislations and 
policy documents.  
Ethiopian Investment law proclamation no.769/2012 and Council of Ministers Regulation No. 
220/2012 are the most important legislations that shade light on the overall picture about the 
economic policy of the government. Developmental state wants to protect its domestic investors 
from foreign competition and at the same time it wants to attract foreign investment in some 
designated areas. Accordingly, one of the objectives of the investment law at Art 5(3) says its 
                                                          
50
 Kefale (n 20) 8. 
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goal is to develop the domestic market through the growth of production, productivity and 
service.  
When we go through the details of the legislation, it incorporates three main characteristics of 
developmental state policies. The first one is state monopoly or partaking of the state in certain 
sectors like postal service, air transport and telecom.
51
 Preservation of some sectors for the 
domestic investors and minimum capital requirement for foreign investors are the second 
feature.
52
 For example the financial, packaging, shipping, broadcasting and advertisement sectors 
are only allowed for Ethiopian investors. The third developmental state nature of the law is it 
gives incentives for foreign investors to invest in those areas that are strategically important for 
the rapid industrialization of the country. These incentives include tax exemption, free import 
duty and establishing of industry zone.
53
  
Another distinguishing feature of developmental state is the existence of state controlled business 
enterprises. These enterprises will engage in areas that are not attractive to the private investors 
or that are highly profitable. State owned enterprises are closely associated with the economy of 
the present-day Ethiopia. They extensively participate in mining, construction, production and 
service sectors. The story does not end here in Ethiopia. There are business enterprises which are 
not owned by the government but affiliated to the ruling party. These enterprises do not have any 
relationship with developmental state, but they will and are complicating the negotiation process 
to accede to the WTO.
54
 
 When a state participates in widespread economic undertakings it needs extra money to 
accomplish this goal than the state which only does traditional state activities. To live up to this 
goal it shall generate additional income in the form of taxes and tariffs. Ethiopia as a 
developmental state its tariff levels are high i.e. the average tariff is 17.3%.
55
 This is more than 
the WTO members‟ average. Tariffs cover a big share of government income. Import duties 
account for 39.5% of the total government revenue.
56
 Taxes rates are also high, to mention some: 
there is a 35% tax for incomes more than 250 USD; 15% VAT is also levied almost in all 
                                                          
51
 Proclamation no. 769/2012, Article 6  
52
 Proclamation no. 769/2012, Article 7 
53
Proclamation no. 769/2012, Article 7 
54
 See round 2 questions and answers (Q 18). 
55
 WTO countries basic indicators Ethiopia (found at http:// www.wto.org) 
56
 Ibid. 
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transactions; further more businesses are required to pay 30% profit tax and last but not least Sur 
and Excise taxes are also  imposed on imported goods. 
To sum up, developmental state is not a new phenomenon. The developed countries at one point 
used it to advance the economic and social ends of their society. In the 20
th
 century the concept 
was applied in a more comprehensive and convincing way in South East Asian countries. 
However, the collapse of communist Soviet Union undermines the role of the state in the 
economic transformation. As a consequence the so called „Washington consensus‟ dominates the 
political discourse of recent decades. Despite the fact that interventionist policy of a state was 
doomed by world powers and neo-liberal scholars, some African, Asian and Latin American 
countries have challenged the wisdom of the market and the private investor for rapid economic 
growth. Ethiopia as a country led by the ideology of developmental state for the last ten years, it 
has legislations especially in the economic sector that reflects the same narrative. The 
government has a mandate by these legislations to actively participate in economic activities. 
The engagement ranges from prohibiting individuals to own land to determining the price of 
certain goods. In the next chapters I will try to formulate the relationship between these laws and 
policies of Ethiopia which are inspired by developmental state ideology and accession to the 
WTO.  
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Chapter 3 
A discussion about the WTO accession process 
 
3.1. General background on accession to the WTO 
 
The WTO, an organization with a goal of liberalizing and regulating international trade, was 
established as a result of a multilateral trade agreement signed in 1995.
57
 Before the formation of 
WTO, GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade) was the main international mechanism to 
regulate cross-border trade in goods. 128 countries signed the Marrakesh agreement which 
created the body responsible to independently supervise trade transactions among the members. 
WTO facilitates the administration of the agreements in trade in goods, trade in services and 
trade related intellectual property rights.
58
  
The two key principles in the agreement of WTO are non-discrimination and reciprocity. 
59
 Non-
discrimination is basically articulated by the principle of Most Favored Nation treatment (MFN). 
It means every member should get the treatment similar to the one extended to the most 
benefited country. On the other hand the principle of reciprocity bars the existence of free riders 
in the system; as a result every member has the duty to commit one to another to eliminate trade 
barriers.  
Like other international agreements WTO is open for non-members to accede whenever they are 
interested. “Accession is the international law term used when states that are not original parties 
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to a treaty decide to join it and accept rights and obligations the treaty contains.”60  Accession to 
the WTO is governed by Article XII of the WTO agreement. The provision reads as follows: 
1.  Any state or separate customs territory possession full 
      autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial 
      relations and of the other matters provided for in this 
      agreement and the multilateral trade agreements 
      may accede to this agreement on terms to be agreed 
      between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to 
      this agreement and multilateral trade agreements annexed  
      thereto. 
2. Decision on Accession shall be taken by the Ministerial 
     Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the 
     agreement on the terms of accession by a two-third majority 
     of the members of the WTO. 
3. Accession to a plurilateral Trade agreement shall be 
    governed by the provision of that agreement. 
 
After 1995 thirty five countries joined the organization via the above article. The last country to 
join WTO in 2014 is Seychelles. Today, 161 members of WTO account for just about all 
international trade transactions. Iran is the largest economy outside the multilateral trade 
agreement.
61
 The remaining non- member countries are either in the process of negotiation or 
they are at observer state stage. Typically these countries have small or minimal trade relation 
with the rest of the world or they are politically unstable. The worldwide membership to the 
WTO clearly exhibits that a responsible government would not think to benefit its country by 
staying outside the system.  
Scores of African states are members to the WTO. But there is no one African country that 
joined the organization through accession under Article XII. All African member states joined 
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the organization through succession. Succession is a process whereby colonized countries had 
the opportunity to join the organization under Article XXI: 5(c) of GATT once they got their 
independence. 
Accession to the multilateral trade agreement, GATT 1947 was not as such a cumbersome 
process. Some said the balance of power at that time was not in the hands of the members but in 
the hands of the acceding countries.
62
 This may shows at the early stage GATT signatory 
countries were desperate to attract new members. After the GATT transformed itself in to WTO 
in 1995, the story was completely changed; joining WTO becomes an adventure that needs a lot 
of energy and patience.   
As stated before, the Accession process to the WTO demand an extended period of time. To 
show this with context, the accession of China took more than 15 years and it was the longest 
until recently. The conclusion of the accession saga of Russia took the crown from China as the 
longest accession by five more years. Moreover the accession of Algeria has already exceeded 
25 years; but it is not yet finalized. 
There are different factors for the lengthy accession period for prospective members. These 
factors can be categorized as internal and external. The internal factors are those obscurities 
which lie in the accession system of the WTO. The brevity and vagueness of Article XII which 
resulted in the lack of a clean cut and predetermined preconditions for a country to fulfill before 
joining WTO is often raised as the main deficiency of the system.
63
  This undermines the rule 
based system and produces power and negotiations based outcome.  As one commentator 
observed the process of accession is largely governed by unwritten rules derived from precedents 
and previous rulings.
64
 Regrettably, due to the above glitch in the system the process would not 
end before sucking in an unlimited period of time.  
The external factors are about the level of readiness of the acceding country to follow up the 
negotiation in a scheduled manner. For some countries after membership application, they wait 
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years even to submit the memorandum. The reasons could differ from country to country. Some 
lack technical capacity to pursue the negotiation and others lose interest in the course of 
accession due to internal political upheavals.  
By its very nature multilateral trading system aims to be universal. However when we look in to 
WTO‟s accession practices, countries negotiate for up to more than two decades to finalize their 
entry. This shows the primary goal of WTO is not universalization of membership but 
compliance with the norms of the organization as set by the members. The WTO officials say 
that WTO is a rule based system, but as said above many commentators conclude that the 
accession process has no rules but precedent and power.
65
 Moreover the negotiation is one sided 
process, only the acceding country required to make commitments without getting or expecting 
the same from the WTO members.
66
 
In the negotiation process some members play a dominant role than others. The Western powers 
(USA, European Union and Canada) and Japan are active participants in demanding the 
newcomers to concede as much as possible in the negotiations. “The US especially treats these 
negotiations in a regime context, meaning that the commitments that it seeks from each acceding 
country are viewed in the broader framework of the rules that the US negotiator want to see 
applied uniformly to all WTO members.”67 
During the accession process members examine the legal frame work and the institutional 
capacity for enforcing policies affecting trade in goods, services and intellectual property. The 
acceding country need to have adequate, fair and transparent judicial, arbitral and administrative 
tribunals or procedures. 
 Market access commitment for goods includes negotiations on tariff levels and commitments to 
eliminate non-tariff measures like quotas. Tariff level negotiation is about setting bound rates 
and applied tariff rates. The bound tariff level is the maximum tariff level that cannot be 
exceeded once the commitment was agreed. “In practice however, most actual tariff rates 
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(applied rates) are lower than the bound level allowing some flexibility for future changes by the 
new members.”68 
In the market access commitments for service all four mode of service delivery methods will be 
negotiated. These are cross border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and 
presence of natural persons. The acceding country is required to open most of its service sectors 
in all the four modes to foreign competition; it includes the banking sector, telecommunication, 
energy and healthcare.
69
 Further the General Agreement on Services (GATS) requires members 
to list down those sectors that foreigners are allowed to participate. Thus the acceding state is 
expected to bring to the table its initial list of commitments to initiate the negotiation.  
Another sensitive area of negotiation is Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs). 
Acceding countries are required to adjust their legal regime in respect of intellectual property 
such as patents, copyright and trademarks. Unlike tariff and service negotiations, the capacity to 
implement the requirements enshrined in the TRIPs is the main focus of the fact finding stage of 
the negotiation.
70
 Although a country has legislations that comply with TRIPs standards, it could 
lack the bureaucratic machine to implement it. Thus, members should develop their competence 
to enforce intellectual property rights while the negotiation progresses.   
There are also some other basic areas of WTO agreement that will dominate the negotiation 
platform; to mention a few, transition period, special and differential treatment (S&D) and 
subsidies. “A transition period is a period of time that allows a member to phase in or delay 
certain additions or charges to its laws to become fully incompliance with its new WTO 
obligations.”71 During the transition period members will have the time to adjust with the new 
obligations. There is an argument whether this transition period is applicable to those countries 
that joined the organization after 1995. Developed countries argue that acceding countries have 
enough time to adjust while negotiating the agreement, so they contend that the original 
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transition period had passed and new comers should not claim it as of right.
72
 But experience 
shows that countries that negotiate tough still secure a reasonable transition period.  
Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) is a system designed to protect the most vulnerable 
economies. It allows countries to take measures that would otherwise contradict with WTO rules. 
It includes withdrawing previous commitments in order to protect infant industries, providing 
domestic subsidies and so on. The enabling close agreed in 1979 in Tokyo also permits S&D 
treatment in respect of tariffs, non-tariff measure and regional trading agreements. 
73
 Although 
S&D does not have a direct impact on the negotiation process, it helps negotiators to assess the 
limit of their negotiation leverage. Major WTO powers have the position that new members are 
not legally entitled to S&D and they argue that what binds them is what is negotiated. However, 
despite the fact that there is a tremendous pressure from western countries in the accession of 
new members to eliminate S&D treatment, some S&Ds concession have been agreed with 
acceding countries.
74
 
The issue of subsidies is the most controversial area both in the negotiation stage and later in the 
implementation stage. All subsides are not prohibited. Those actions that have no or minimal 
trade distorting impact are green box subsidies. “Careful examination of green box subsidies is a 
part of fact finding process.”75 Based on their level of development countries should argue for 
the inclusion of at least some subsides that are normally considered as amber box. Least 
developed countries like Ethiopia must negotiate vehemently to get flexible subsidy agreement 
package; especially in the area of agriculture and export trade.  
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3.2 Benefits of accession to the WTO   
 
Joining WTO has a diverse effect on different segments of the population of a country. 
Consumers expect that the more competitors in the market the less the price of goods would be. 
Business community has also an interest; the importer will benefit from the decreasing tariff 
level. And as the tariff levels in the destination countries of their goods will change for good, the 
same is true for the exporters. Politician will also assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
accession to the constituent they represent. Accession even touches those who work in the 
administrative and judicial sector. Authorities and judges are required to take in to consideration 
the new legal reality created by the country‟s accession when they decide on trade related 
matters.  
On the other hand, joining the WTO has an outward and inward implication for the economy a 
country.
76
Acquiring permanent and unconditional MFN status when trading with other member 
states is the main external benefit of accession to the WTO. This will result in the integration of 
the economy of the country to the global economy.
77
 The opportunity to participate in 
international trade rule making is another benefit of joining WTO. By taking part in the rule 
making process, a country can influence for the incorporation of its interests in future 
negotiations.
78
 Further, as the WTO is a universal trade negotiating medium, members will save 
cost by avoiding multiple trade negotiating forums.
79
 Moreover the presence of a dispute 
resolution mechanism in the WTO system is another advantage especially for weaker countries 
which have minimal diplomatic influence on others.
80
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When you look at the benefits of joining WTO from internal perspective, it creates improved 
business climate for both domestic and foreign investors. Countries are obliged to take reforms 
in respect of trade policies and laws so that they can join the WTO. Reforms against unfair 
competition and unlawful use of intellectual property will create attractive business environment 
for entrepreneurs. Hence, the international commitment made by a state would make the 
government to be more caution to intervene in to the market.
81
 Accession to WTO requires 
implementing laws and regulations to eliminate trade barriers, as a result it increase transparency 
and promote rule of law. Once those reforms are made, though the government changes its 
policy on free market through time, it cannot unwritten the rules and change the commitment 
regarding WTO as easily as domestic legal rules.
82
 On the other term, “the credibility of a reform 
minded government may itself be enhanced if the government can „tie its hand‟ through WTO 
membership. The international implications of ranging on promised reforms may represent a 
political cost to the government that makes it more likely that it will stick to its announced 
policies.”83   
 
3.3 Accession procedures 
 
The non-mandatory stage of observer status is the first pre-accession formality for a state which 
intends to join WTO. It is a process whereby prospective members will warm up before the 
formal negotiation starts. In its five years period a country is expected to be acquainted with the 
basic information and knowhow to start the accession. Whether a country passes through 
observer state or not it has to go through six stages to tie up its aspiration for accession. The 
stages are: -
84
 
1. Submission of formal request for accession 
2. Establishment of working party 
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3. Submission of memorandum on foreign trade regime 
4. Fact finding and negotiations in the terms of accession 
5. Adoption of the report of the working party for accession 
6. Approval of the accession by the General Counsel or Ministerial Conference 
The request for accession under Article XII of WTO agreement shall be submitted to the General 
Director. The office of the Director will circulate the request to all members for discussion in the 
next General Counsel meeting.
85
 At General Counsel meeting the working party will be formed. 
In principle every member of the WTO has the right to participate in the working party. 
However, the significance of a country in the world trade determines the size of the working 
party. From past accessions, countries with sizable economy and international trade activity like 
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia attracted huge participation in the working party. On the other 
hand, usually only neighboring countries and world powers such as USA, European Union and 
Japan are interested in the working party of LDCs accession. Nevertheless, if members change 
their mind during the accession process, the working party is open at any stage of the negotiation 
for partaking.
86
 
Memorandum on foreign trade regime is standardized document describing the countries trade 
and economic policies and legal frame work that are related to trade obligations. It is a bulky and 
detailed document.
87
 The memorandum covers mainly six areas.
88
 The first is about the general 
economy, economic policy and foreign trade of the country. To mention some issues that have to 
be addressed in this part; the current economic situation, the direction of the economic, monetary 
and fiscal policy, investment and competition policies and information about remittance and 
economic growth in connection with goods and services are the major ones.  
The second part is about framework for making and enforcing policies affecting foreign trade in 
goods and services. Here the entire legal system of the country in respect of legislating, 
enforcing and interpretation of laws should be illustrated. 
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The third part deals with specific policies on trade in goods. Import regulations, tariffs, quotas, 
licensing procedures, state trading practices, free economic zones and the like shall be explained 
in-depth.  
The fourth and fifth sections are about services and trade related intellectual property. And the 
last element is about economic relations of the applicant country with third countries. Bilateral 
and multilateral economic agreements and cooperation that a country has concluded or intends to 
conclude shall be pointed out in this part. 
The most important and difficult stage is the fact finding and negotiation process. Working party 
members try to investigate the prospective member‟s trade policies, its readiness and ability to 
join the organization by asking questions and receiving answers in writing. The questions will 
address areas of inconsistency with WTO obligations. The negotiating countries are expected to 
ensure how to address the inconsistencies in its replies. The fact finding process will also also 
continue in the working party meetings.
89
 
The negotiation process takes place in bilateral and multilateral phases. Trade in goods and 
services negotiation is conducted in the form of offer and request. The negotiating country has 
first to put its initial offer on market access on goods and services to ignite the negotiation. The 
end result of the negotiation is to produce schedule of tariffs concession and schedule on specific 
commitments in services.
90
 
The working party organizes and summarizes the final outcome of the negotiation to produce a 
consolidated single agreement. This agreement is known as protocol of accession. Then the draft 
schedule will be distributed to the members of the working party for review. Once the document 
is good enough for everybody, the protocol of accession will be submitted to the General 
Counsel or the Ministerial Conference for approval.
91
  
The final stage of accession is the adoption of the protocol by the General Counsel. Traditionally 
consensus is the way to approve membership of the acceding country.
92
 But two-third majority is 
only required per the WTO agreement. There is also a blocking alternative for the unsatisfied 
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members. It is a mechanism to restrict a new member‟s right and obligations from taking effect 
as between a country and the new member.
93
 Finally the candidate state becomes a WTO 
member after it adopts the accession agreement through its own treaty ratification process. 
 
3.4 „WTO- plus‟ obligations and „WTO- Minus‟ rights 
 
The most contentious and recently originated issue in relation to accession is the prescription of 
obligations that exceed the requirements of WTO agreements to the new members. The most 
powerful members of WTO make demands from acceding countries that go beyond the 
commitments made by the original members.
94
 Such obligations are called „WTO- plus‟ 
obligations and „WTO- Minus‟ rights. „WTO- plus‟ obligations refer to commitments that go 
beyond the WTO agreement; whereas „WTO- Minus‟ rights refer to commitments where new 
members relinquish rights available to the members.
95
 
The issue of „WTO- plus‟ obligations and „WTO- minus‟ rights is usually raised in relation to 
market access obligations. These obligations are laid down in the member‟s goods and service 
schedules. To put it in to perspective  “on the service sector, Eventt and Primo Braga (2006)  
observed that LDCs, developing and developed founding members of the WTO, respectively 
committed on average 20, 44 and 108 sub sectors. By contrast, countries in all categories that 
have acceded since 1995 committed an average of 104 sub sectors.”96 
Prior to the accession of China, the issue of WTO plus obligation is rarely talked about. But 
when the accession protocol of China made public, which is different from the standardized 
document with 143 paragraphs, the concept explodes and generates a lot of academic debates. 
China‟s „WTO- plus‟ obligations are in the areas of transparency, judicial review, foreign 
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investment, national treatment of foreign investors, economic reform, government procurement 
and compliance.
97
 
Another manifestation for „WTO- plus‟ obligation is the fact that acceding countries are 
demanded to accept plurilateral agreements on government procurement and information 
technology agreement.
98
 Under the original accord these agreements are only optional for 
interested parties to join.
99
 
Below are some „WTO- plus‟ commitments made by acceding countries:100 
 Moldova committed to reduce the use of price control in its economy. 
 China committed to remove the fifty percent foreign equity limit for joint venture 
in the motor vehicle industry. 
 Taiwan committed to permit advertising for alcoholic beverages. 
 Saudi Arabia committed to not imposing duties on iron and steel scrap. 
 China committed to publishing an official journal dedicated to the publication of 
laws and regulations that are related to WTO commitments. 
„WTO- Minus‟ right is mainly in relation to the question of transition period. 101 The original 
WTO members were allowed for one, five and eleven years of transitional period based on the 
level of their economic development. China, Taiwan, Lithonia and Ecuador were given less 
transitional period in areas were transitional period is permitted for founding members. However, 
availability of transitional period for acceding countries is a point of disagreement. The USA has 
the position that it is only a right for the original members. Even the WTO has taken the position 
that acceding countries should not claim transitional period as of right.
102
  
As said before non-discrimination and reciprocity are the founding pillars of WTO agreement; 
however, I think the non-existence of membership criteria or clarification about the terms to be 
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agreed under Article XII of the WTO paves the way to the erosion of these two core principles 
by way of „WTO- plus‟ obligations and „WTO- minus‟ rights. 
The practice of „WTO- plus‟ obligations and „WTO- minus‟ rights is criticized by many 
commentators as it leads for second class WTO citizens.
103
 WTO differs from the 1947 GATT 
because it is a rule based system. Rule based system needs a uniformity of rules throughout its 
members. If the rule of the game differs from member to member, the system will lose its rule of 
law touch and will be subjected to power based relationship. Therefore, taking in to 
consideration the undesirable impact that will be created by „WTO- plus‟ obligations and „WTO- 
minus‟ rights on the system, and taking in to account that only weak and politically unstable 
countries are currently outside the system, I strongly believe that the WTO has to make serious 
effort to curb this trend in the remaining accessions. 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis of the effects of developmental state policies on 
Ethiopian trade laws and its impact on the negotiation for 
accession 
 
The past 100 years of Ethiopian history shows that the country passed through three different 
political/economical ideologies. They are feudalism, socialism and capitalism; these same 
ideologies had inspired the policies and legal frameworks of successive governments. The 
monarchy was primarily known for its feudalist doctrine. However the last emperor of Ethiopia, 
Haileselasse I, introduced policies with capitalist flavor. As a manifestation to this the 1960 civil 
and commercial codes are carbon copies of the laws of the Western world. 
In the 1974, the military deposed the king and launched socialist economic policies. The military 
regime viewed private capital as hostile to the state. Consequently it announced private capital 
cap. Moreover it pronounced that the government would own and administer all economic 
resources and would provide all services to the people. During the military rule, though the 
government proclaimed specific socialism inspired legislations like the 1975 urban extra land 
confiscation decree, it didn‟t introduce a comprehensive codified Marxist commercial or civil 
law. 
Today, the codes that were passed by the imperialist parliament govern most of the civil and 
commercial matters of the country. However following the current government path to 
development state ideology, parts of these codes were repealed and replaced by specific 
legislations. 
As said before developmental state vigorously participates in economic activities, hence it needs 
enough revenue to realize this mission. In order to live up to the additional demand for revenue, 
it usually levies hefty tariffs and taxes on imported goods. On the other spectrum a government 
34 
 
with developmental state agenda strives to empower the local population economically. So its 
laws usually reserve some important sectors from the ambit of foreign investors. Equally, 
developmental state also bans the participation of both domestic and foreign businessmen in 
some vital economic sectors. Therefore taking in to consideration this context; I will try to shade 
some light about the challenges and possible outcomes of the negotiation to accede to the WTO. 
Before starting to look deep into the accession of Ethiopia, it is wise to briefly review the 
requirements of GATT and GATS. The obligation that is expected from the WTO members can 
be classified in to two: the first is general obligation to adhere to the common and uniform rules. 
These rules include transparency, most favored nation (MFN) and reasonable, objective and 
impartial application of domestic regulations.
104
 And the second obligation is specific 
commitments. These obligations are negotiable and country specific. They include tariff level 
reduction and market access commitments in the services sector.
105
 
WTO accession procedure has special treatment for least developed countries (LDCs) like 
Ethiopia. Article IV.3 of GATS says there shall be a specific consideration for LDCs while 
negotiating specific commitments. In addition to this the Committee on Trade and Development 
and the General Council adopts a guideline which says members should exercise restraint in 
seeking commitments from acceding LDCS.
106
 Therefore, these and other provisions of WTO 
instruments about developing countries shall be taken into account in analyzing Ethiopia‟s 
negotiation with the organization.  
WTO negotiation process is a multitier system and it involves fact finding bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations at the same time. The negotiation covers all the WTO agreements; 
however, I will try to briefly discuss the issue of tariffs in the context of developmental state 
accession but the main focus will be on the negotiation of market access commitments for trade 
in services.  
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4.1  Tariff/Tax level negotiation 
Before 1993 Ethiopia‟s tariff level was a reflection of the socialist government policy of import 
substitution. Since 1993 the government has taken serious tariff amendment measures as a result 
the maximum import tariff decreased from 230% to 35% step by step and the average tariff level 
had been reduced from 41.6% to 17.5%.
107
 However, Ethiopia‟s tariff rate is still high when 
compared with other WTO members‟ average.108 
The government does not only impose tariffs on imported goods, it also collects different kinds 
of taxes from the same goods. Almost all imported goods are subject to 10% surtax per the Sur 
tax regulation no. 133/2007; directive no. 58/03 of Ethiopian Customs Authority lets the 
government to collect cargo scanning fee from imported goods. There are also internal taxes that 
are applicable on imports too. These are Excise tax and VAT. Imported goods which vary from 
drinks to automobiles are subject to Excise tax rate which ranges from 10% to 100% per 
Proclamation no. 307/02. On the other hand Proclamation no.285/2002 imposes 15% VAT on 
almost all imported goods. And Article 52 of the income tax law adds one more type of revenue 
for the government.
109
 It requires a 3% income tax to be collected on business income at the time 
of the import of goods or commercial use. This tax is commonly known as withheld tax. 
The total amount collected from the aforementioned duties and taxes accounts for about 40% of 
the government revenue in 2010/11 budget year.
110
 Although levying duties and taxes on 
imported goods to maximize the revenue of the government is in line with the policies of 
development state, it contradicts with trade liberalization policies of the WTO. Notwithstanding 
its developmental policy, the government of Ethiopia relatively reduces its tariff levels for the 
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past 20 years voluntarily as part of its economic reform. However, the reduction is not sufficient 
when assessed against WTO standards. Besides, in my understanding these reforms were not 
made in connection with the accession process. On the other hand, the experiences of other 
acceding countries show that as part of their bid to join the organization, they reduce their trade 
barriers even before they were forced by the WTO members. China had decreased its duties to 
15% for agriculture products and 8.9% for industrial goods before it was accepted to the WTO as 
a sign of good gesture. 
111
 
As a result of several rounds of negotiations on tariff levels, the tariff level of member states has 
gone decreasing and decreasing from time to time. Hence, the expectation from acceding 
countries including LDCs increases as the day goes by. The protraction of the process of 
accession will not help Ethiopia‟s cause to join the WTO with minimum cost. Thus, in my 
opinion the country has to decide at this instant to bring its demand for maximum revenue in 
conformity with trade barrier elimination objectives of WTO. Tariff reduction will obviously 
decrease the income of the government, which will have an effect that will be easily felt by 
developmental states like Ethiopia. But joining WTO would also bring all kinds of economic 
opportunities for a state. Therefore, Ethiopia has to choose as China did to progressively and 
quickly reduce not only tariffs but also disguised duties like surtax and cargo scanning fee to 
finalize its accession process in the near future. 
 
4.2  Market Access Commitments for Trade in services 
 
From developmental state perspective trade in services is the most controversial area of the 
negotiation. Finance, Telecom, transport, power and health sectors are the center of gravity for 
the disagreement. Ethiopia as a developmental state has legislations which authorizes the 
government to predominantly engage in strategic business areas such as telecom and power 
plant. On the other hand these laws, with the goal of empowering the domestic investor, restrict 
foreigners from participating in businesses like finance, transport, packaging, forwarding, 
broadcasting, legal service, education, health care, etc. 
                                                          
111
 Jeffrey L. Gertler, ‘What china’s WTO Accession is all about’ (WTO secretariat 2002) 26. 
37 
 
The 1994 GATS in its preamble states that its goal is to expand trade in services through 
transparency and progressive liberalization. As a direct reflection to this principle both 
developed countries and developing countries commit to liberalize significant part of service 
sectors in their service commitment schedules. Moreover, countries which joined after 1995 
through the accession process agreed to liberalize wide-ranging areas in their respective service 
sector. For instance China and Vietnam, which have comparable economic policies with 
Ethiopia, agreed to liberalize significant part of their respective service sectors in all 4 modes.  
In the GATS regime the extent of market access and national treatment that the acceding country 
grants is a matter of negotiation. However, progressive liberalization, transparency and MFN are 
non- negotiable principles and members are obliged to comply with it.  
Among various service sectors I will examine three most important and contentious ones in light 
of both the negotiable and non-negotiable principles. These are finance, telecom and transport 
sectors. The current legal regime of these sectors, their possible liberalization scenarios and the 
likely way forward for the current stalemate in the negotiation between Ethiopia and the working 
party will be addressed. 
 
4.2.1 Financial sector 
The government of Ethiopia believes that the financial sector has a vital role in the economic 
development of the country. And like many other countries it wants to tightly control the sector. 
The 2012 investment proclamation excludes foreigners from participating in this sector. 
Consequently, banking, insurance and microfinance businesses are currently transacted by the 
government and local businessmen only.  
Although, not all WTO members allow foreign banks and insurance companies to freely operate 
or wholly owned by non-nationals, as part of their accession package members commit in one or 
another way to open up their financial sector. Therefore, Ethiopian current total exclusion of the 
sector will be scrutinized under microscopic eyes by the working party and during the bilateral 
negotiation stage.  
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When we look at Ethiopian standpoint on financial sector in light of the four modes of supply the 
picture is almost the same with slight differences from one mode to another mode. 
Cross border supply of financial service (mode 1):- is almost restricted except for reinsurance. 
Currently Ethiopian insurance companies are allowed to buy reinsurance from abroad. 
Consumption abroad of financial service (mode 2):- is also practically prohibited by requiring 
companies to surrender their foreign currency to the national bank. 
As I said above commercial presence of foreign financial institutions (mode 3) is barred 
statutorily. Since commercial presence is not allowed the concept of the presence of natural 
persons (mode 4) is irrelevant. However, as a general labor rule all foreigners are only allowed to 
work in the country except in rare cases after securing work permit from authorities in advance. 
On the other hand, let us have a look at the position of Ethiopia in respect of the financial sector 
against the non-negotiable principles of the GATS i.e. transparency, MFN and progressive 
liberalization. 
Transparence: - Ethiopia publishes laws regarding finance (Proclamations and Regulations) in 
its official journal, Negarit Gazette. However, directives issued by relevant organs like Customs 
and Revenue Authority, Investment Agency and Ministry of Finance are not published in official 
journal. Although recently government offices have started to avail directives in their websites, 
taking in to consideration the frequent downing of the sites Ethiopia has to publish its directives 
to fully comply with the transparency requirement of GATS.  
From the perspective of MFN, Ethiopia currently does not allow any country or its nationals to 
participate in the financial sector. Therefore, as there is no discrimination based on country of 
origin, there will not be an issue in relation to MFN in the financial sector in its current shape. 
Progressive liberalization: - Ethiopian government has a firm position not to open up the 
financial sector to foreign participation.
112
 But as one of the pillars of the foundation of WTO is 
progressive liberalization, the current stance of Ethiopia is entirely in contradiction with it. I 
think, so long as that the country wants to join WTO, making commitments in the financial 
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sector is unavoidable. Therefore, the best way forward is to adopt a strategy to minimize the 
extent of the commitments so as not to lose the whole concept of developmental state ideology 
after going through the negotiation process.  
In the above context I will try to recommend the possible commitments that are necessary to be 
made for the goal of accession. WTO members will require commitments to be laid down in 
each of the four modes of supply. Thus, my recommendation for the financial sector will be 
suggested separately for each mode. 
Cross border supply of financial service (mode 1):- Naturally allowing firms to be established 
or to be incorporated in Ethiopia by foreign investors will benefit the country as they bring the 
much needed foreign currency with them. However, unregulated risk taking by financial 
institutions abroad will have a consequence at home. Banks which take a lot of bad loans abroad 
may need restructuring from the local government and tax payers‟ money. 
When we see the case of China, it didn‟t put specific restrictions for most of cross boarder 
supply.
113
 Therefore, the wise strategy for Ethiopia in this regard is to demand extended 
transition period and restrict the group of persons that will be allowed to engage in such activity. 
This will help to limit the damage that could possibly be imported from financial meltdown in 
other countries. Thus, as subsidiaries of foreign firms presumably would not ask Ethiopian 
government help for their business miscalculations with customers outside Ethiopia, allowing 
only them to engage in cross boarder supply of financial service is a reasonable commitment. 
Consumption abroad of financial service (mode 2):- these kinds of transactions takes place 
outside Ethiopia, hence it is difficult to monitor the business. As long as foreign currency 
regulations of the country are adhered, I believe its impact on Ethiopian financial sector is 
limited. Moreover looking in to the accession package of recently joined members, it is rare to 
find a country which put limitation in this mode. Therefore, this places Ethiopia in a position to 
follow the precedent and allow consumption abroad of financial services. 
The most important for the banking and insurance businesses is mode 3; taking in to account 
pervious accessions, there are four main options for market opening in this respect. These are: 
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1. The establishment of full foreign owned firms.  
2.  The establishment of partial foreign owned firms. 
3. The establishment of full/partial foreign owned firms in designated areas. 
4. The establishment of full/partial foreign owned firms after transition period. 
When we look at the case of China, by 2000 i.e. before accession, foreign banks and financial 
institutions had already set up 191 representative offices and subsidiaries.
114
 However, these 
foreign firms were not allowed to operate without restrictions, their presence was limited in areas 
like the Shanghai/Beijing corridor.
115
 After accession China removed the geographical 
restrictions within 5 years. Similarly in 2006 all restrictions on insurance were lifted except the 
foreign ownership limit on life insurance.
116
  
Therefore, the experience of China clearly shows that Ethiopian financial sector will not come 
out unscratched of the negotiation process. Hence, if Ethiopia seriously wants to join the WTO in 
the near future, it has to start liberalizing the sector beginning from now. In my opinion total 
liberalization of the sector is unrealistic because foreign banks and insurance companies of most 
advanced economies will undoubtedly wipe out the infant domestic industry. On the other hand 
as Ethiopia is a tiny economy when compared with China, I believe the strategy China followed 
to liberalize the sector in designated areas will not be accepted by WTO members in Ethiopian 
case. Thus the feasible tactic that the negotiating team should follow is on the one hand to press 
for extended transitional period and on the other hand insisting on limited ownership in the form 
of joint venture with local financial institutions. 
Temporary presence of natural persons (mode 4):- In the service sector the issue of temporary 
presence of natural persons is dependent on the liberalization committed in mode 3. Hence, if 
Ethiopia agrees for commercial presence of foreign financial firms, logically it has to make 
commitments in mode 4. However, the liberalization in this mode should follow the standard 
precedent and Ethiopia shall only agree for the temporary presence of senior management staff 
and executives.  
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4.2.2 Telecom 
Traditionally telecommunication sector is divided in two; basic and value added service. Basic 
service i.e. voice data transmition, telex, telegram is usually subject to market access restrictions. 
On the other hand value added services i.e. electronic mail, online information are more open to 
competition.
117
 
Pursuant to the 2012 investment law Article 6(2) (b) both foreign and domestic investors are 
only allowed to invest in telecom business jointly with the government. But the Council of 
Ministers regulation, which is enacted to implement the investment law and to determine 
investment areas that are reserved to domestic investors, is silent on the issue that whether 
foreigners are allowed or not to form joint venture with the government. The regulation only 
refers the issue for further determination by the Ministry of Information Technology. Previously 
the government on several occasions promised to liberalize the sector once nationwide expansion 
of basic telecom is achieved. This policy stand is apparently comes from the assumption that 
telecom service in rural areas is not profitable. Hence, the private investor will only concentrate 
on collecting large amount of profit from urban areas with no intent to re-invest the profit in less 
profitable rural parts of the country. However, in recent couple of years the telecom service 
specially mobile phone service has become available throughout the country including very 
remote rural areas. In my observation though the aforementioned logic of the government can no 
more hold water, the government does show no sign yet to fully liberalize the sector. 
Furthermore despite the fact that the existing legal regime allows joint venture in telecom 
business, but then in practices the government monopoly carries on. 
From China‟s accession protocol it is clear that China and WTO members met in half way. By 
denying foreign firms majority share, China tried to preserve its identity on developmental 
government i.e. domestic control over basic industries. Nevertheless, China agreed for foreign 
access in all geographic areas after five years of accession with a limitation of 49% foreign 
equity both in basic and value added services.
118
 Vietnam too agreed to significantly liberalize its 
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telecom business when it joined the WTO in 2007. It allows for foreign access in both basic and 
value added services with 51% cap on asset.
119
 
When we look deep in to the recent accessions of developmental (quasi-developmental 
governments) and LDCs, Ethiopian current position on government monopoly of telecom is not 
attainable position. Therefore there has to be at least conditional liberalization as China and other 
countries did to find a common ground with the members. The conditions may include equity 
cap, geographic limitation or transition period. In my opinion, for the long term development and 
benefit of the of the sector and the customers respectively, minority equity by foreigners for 
about 10 years of transition period and full liberalization then after is  a fair outcome from the 
negotiation to Ethiopia. 
 
4.2.3  Transport 
 
Transport means are Rail, Road, Air and Maritime. As foreign investors are primarily interested 
in Air and Maritime services, the working party will focus throughout the negotiation on these 
two sectors. Railway service is the least attractive for foreign investors because they don‟t have 
any interest to invest in mountainous country like Ethiopia, which has almost no infrastructure in 
the sector. Thus I will only examine the remaining three sectors. 
The legal environment regarding foreign participation in the road transport sector is not plain as 
it is expected to be. The investment proclamation, which has general provisions about the do„s 
and the do not‟s, does not preserve the sector for the government monopoly or joint venture. On 
the other hand the investment regulation, which has the purpose to list down sectors reserved for 
domestic investors and sectors permitted to foreigners, is silent on this issue as well. Thus this 
leaves the sector for the discretion of the Investment Board to allow or deny foreigners to invest 
in road transport business.
120
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When we see the experience of previous accessions, LDCs and developing countries did not 
usually make commitments in this sector.
121
 Whereas, China agreed for the involvement wholly 
owned foreign subsidiaries after sex years of transition period.
122
 
Ethiopia as a country governed by developmental state ideology, the government owns trucking, 
city bus and other transport businesses. And domestic investors are also allowed to engage in any 
kind of road transport business activity. However, in my opinion both government owned and 
privately owned companies are very weak both in organization and finance to compete with 
foreign investors. Thus my advice to the negotiating team is to keep the sector out of discussion 
as much as possible. If this cannot be achieved the maximum liberalization in this sector has to 
be limited to making commitments only in mode 1 and 2. 
Under the GATS, air transport traffic rights and services directly related to traffic rights are 
excluded from the agreement. Thus the context of the discussion in air transport should be seen 
in light of the GATS scope of sphere. 
The 2012 investment regulation has changed the previous limitations for foreigners to engage in 
air ticket selling service and aircraft maintenance (MRO) service. Hence if the working party or 
members in bilateral negotiation adhere strictly to the scope of GATS, there will not be further 
demand from Ethiopia to liberalize in this sector. However my suspicion is that members will 
demand Ethiopia to repeal its government monopoly on air transport service using aircraft with a 
seating capacity more than 50 passengers. Moreover they may also demand the repeal of 
prohibition of foreigners to participate in the remaining seating capacity air transport service. On 
the outset the indefinite exclusion of the air transport service from the ambit of foreign 
participation seems unreasonable. Nevertheless, for the purpose of smoothing the accession road, 
I think the negotiation team should follow a strategy to please WTO members by promising the 
liberalization of the sector after reasonable transition period subsequent to membership. And as 
this promise does not create GATS commitment, legally speaking Ethiopia will not be obliged to 
keep the promise when the time approaches.  
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In the maritime sector the main restrictions set in the investment regulation are the reservation of 
forwarding and shipping agencies only to domestic investor. 
China allows commercial presence for minority joint venture ship operators, whereas it allows 
majority ownership in joint venture for auxiliary services.
123
 On the other hand original members 
of the WTO including both heavy weight members (USA, EU, Canada and Japan) and African 
countries made no commitments in maritime service.
124
 Despite these facts, the working party 
will obviously request Ethiopia to fully liberalize the sector. However Ethiopia shall insist for the 
consideration of the fact that it is a landlocked country when negotiating on the topic. 
Furthermore, Ethiopia as a developmental state needs to empower the domestic businessmen. 
The domestic shipping and forwarding industry may struggle to survive the intense competition 
from foreigners if the sector is fully liberalized in short transition period. Therefore, the inclusion 
of reasonable transitional period and equity cap is vital to sustain the industry in post WTO 
membership era in case liberalization in the sector is unavoidable. 
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Chapter five 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
The WTO rebrands itself from being a club of western powers and their former colonies to a 
worldwide organization in the 21 century by incorporating countries like China, Saudi Arabia 
and Russia to the system. In today‟s globalized world joining the WTO is a mandatory phase for 
a responsible government. The economy of a country cannot really advance unless it is 
integrated with the international trading system through the WTO. The goal of WTO is to 
liberalize international trade and to replace the old power and diplomatic based way of solving 
trade issues and conflicts with rule centered system.  However the process of acceding to the 
WTO notoriously loses its rule appeal and increasingly becomes power and precedent based. As 
a result acceding countries should expect to pledge more than their WTO founding neighbors did 
to be part of the organization. Therefore, it is fair to say that significant liberalization becomes 
the new norm for new comers.  
Ethiopia seems to appreciate the economic benefits of joining the WTO before 10 years. But 
after application for membership in 2003, the government openly adopted the developmental 
state ideology. The policies of developmental state are clearly exhibited in recent business laws 
of the country. The government heavily participates in the economy as a regulator and as an 
actor. Moreover the business environment of the country is not liberalized both from the 
perspective of trade barriers and foreign participation. These policies and laws of developmental 
state are in many respect go against the ambition of quick accession. 
The Chinese government involvement in the economy before accession resembled the current 
Ethiopian situation. China made significant compromises for the sake of joining WTO. But the 
government in Beijing has not lost its developmental nature after accession. On the other hand 
the economy of the country has boomed as a result of the opportunities created by membership. 
Therefore taking in to consideration the Chinese experience, Ethiopia should not fear to make 
reasonable concessions in its current developmental state policies to join the organization.  
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The working Party formed for the accession of Ethiopia has not yet started negotiation with 
Ethiopian negotiating team. As the negotiation stage could consume a lot of time, Ethiopia needs 
to finalize the preparation of its initial service offer and make itself ready for the negotiation 
soon. The negotiation phase needs good preparation both in technical and legal matters. The 
team has to be well equipped in negotiation skills, know-how of previous accessions and 
privileges of LDCs and developing countries. In addition the country has to predetermine its 
priorities and red lines for prudent and organized follow up of the process.  
The negotiation has different major focus areas. The most contentious subjects include tariff rate 
reduction, opening up of the service industry to foreign competition, trade in agriculture products 
and subsidies.  Although Ethiopia made some progress especially in relaxing the foreign 
investment regime recently, demanding work is still required in all areas to make the dream of 
accession a reality. Customs duties and disguised duties like Sur tax have to be reduced and 
eliminated respectively. Dramatic reduction of these lucrative sources of government revenue 
would lead to a plunge in the government funds. In states like Ethiopia where the government 
involves heavily in every aspect of its citizens life the problem would be felt easily. Therefore 
Ethiopia as a developmental state needs to minimize the shock by starting slow reduction in 
advance and by securing as much as possible transition period to implement the changes. 
Trade in services is the major stumbling block in the negotiation between WTO and a 
developmental state like Ethiopia. The current Ethiopian business laws shield the infant service 
sector of the country from competition. Strategic segments of the economy like finance, banking, 
telecom and transport are guarded by these laws from private or foreign participation. In 
principle GATS advocates the opening up every sector for competition. However in practice 
though latecomers have been compelled to liberalize every sector, all members restrict private or 
foreign competition in some areas. Members had reserved those sectors they consider strategic 
from inclusion in their schedules of commitments. But for acceding countries the importance of a 
sector from their perspective would not guarantee an exclusion from the ambit of liberalization. 
The nature of the sector and the interest of the members on that sector would determine whether 
the desire of the acceding country is acceptable or not. Therefore, Ethiopia shall identify those 
sectors that the heavyweight members of WTO would not allow exclusion not to waste time by 
insisting on unachievable goal. Conversely on other sectors, which are not the primary interest of 
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the members, like road and rail way transport, the negotiating team of Ethiopian shall bargain 
hard to exclude the sectors from liberalization. 
In nutshell the legal regime regarding the service sector as manifested mainly in the investment 
proclamation and regulation would not survive without changes as long as Ethiopia wants to join 
the WTO. My recommendation is that Ethiopia should not resist progressive liberalization in 
sensitive service sectors like banking and telecommunication. But transition period and equity 
cap should be part of the grace period to protect the weak domestic industry from melting down 
as a result of the changes. 
Finally after more than 10 years, the accession of Ethiopia is still at the early stages. To avoid a 
repeat of the experience of countries like Algeria, which has been negotiating for a quarter of a 
century, Ethiopia shall recognize the need for compromise on some of its developmental polices 
in exchange for joining the club of the majority of world trading nations. These compromises 
include amending its customs, tax and investment laws.      
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